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I. Introduction
One of the most publicly debated issues about environmental regulation concerns its
e¤ects on the poorest agents and the fairness of such a policy. This question is being raised
again because of the relative failure observed until now of the emissions trading system
chosen as an instrument for the Greenhouse Gases (GHG) regulation, which explains the
emergence of some new arguments in favor of a carbon tax. What would be the inequality
consequences of the European Carbon Tax Project or of the Climate-Energy Contribution
planned by the Grenelle de lenvironnement in France? How could these consequences
be smoothed or even eliminated? More generally, how is it possible to implement an
environmental tax without inducing further inequalities? The economic literature does
not contribute much to this debate and our paper aims to ll the existing gap.
The still open question Can an environmental tax reform be designed without neg-
atively a¤ecting the economic welfare?has given rise to a huge literature on the double
dividend. Terkla [1984], Parry [1995], or Poterba [1993] rst had the intuition that
the recycling of the revenue of an environmental tax could reduce or even eliminate the
gross cost of its implementation. As governments use the revenues from pollution taxes
to decrease other distortionary taxes, environmental taxes may lead to a double dividend,
according to Goulders denition, by improving the environmental quality and achieving
a less distortionary tax system (Goulder [1995]). Baumol and Oates [1988], Pearce
[1991] andOates [1991] suggested that these e¢ ciency gains could be a powerful argument
in favor of environmental taxation. After some prior refutations of the double dividend
hypothesis (Bovenberg and de Mooij [1994] and their followers), Goulder [1995] and
Ligthart [1998] showed that the existence of the double dividend essentially depends
on the possibility of transferring the global tax burden from the wage earners to some
xed production factors or to other consumers, thus emphasizing the role of heterogene-
ity. Following this line, Chiroleu-Assouline and Fodha [2005] and [2006] studied the
existence conditions of a long term double dividend, taking into account the distinction
between wage earners and retired consumers, by means of OLG models.
Surprisingly enough, although this large body of literature has deeply analyzed the
double dividend issue, it has neglected the distribution issue of the welfare gain, although
it is usually obtained at the expense of some groups of agents. It is well known that the
costs and benets of environmental policies are unequally distributed among agents. The
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rich and the poor seem to assign di¤erent degrees of priority to environmental protection
(Baumol and Oates[1988]), since wealthier individuals would accept paying for a higher
level of environmental quality (considered as a normal good). Beyond this fact, distrib-
utive elements also matter when we consider how the costs of a policy of environmental
protection are likely to be distributed among individuals with di¤ering incomes. Most
existing studies are empirical works dealing mainly with the distribution of the benets of
the environmental policies among income classes (Christainsen and Tietenberg [1985],
Elliott et al. [1985], Harrison [1995], Peskin [1978]), and neglecting the cost side of
the policies. One can infer from some empirical studies emphasizing the regressivity of
the indirect taxes, that any environmental policy is likely also to be regressive. In par-
ticular, in the French case, a tax on energy or transport consumption harms the lowest
wage households three times more than the highest wage households (Ruiz and Tran-
noy [2008]). Moreover, the usual recycling of the environmental tax revenues through a
decrease in the labor tax rate could also be regressive (Metcalf [1999]). This point is
of interest in a world in which inequality has assumed high priority among social issues.
Policies and programs that are perceived as unfair will stand little prospect of passage
even if they enhance the prospects for e¢ ciency and sustainability.
Is it then possible to design an environmental policy in order to ensure a non-decreasing
welfare for each class of workers? Compared to the standard double dividend literature
which pursues two objectives in a secondrank framework - improve the environment by
increasing an environmental tax (rst dividend) and the economic welfare by decreasing
another distorsive tax (second dividend) - we add the third objective of Pareto improve-
ment. It corresponds to an acceptability/unanimity criterion for the policy when agents
are heterogenous. Three instruments are consequently needed: we argue that the distrib-
utive properties of the tax policy could be one of the instruments of fair internalization of
the environmental externalities1. The aim of this paper is therefore to design a balanced
environmental tax reform able to correct these regressive properties of taxes and to leave
all classes of worker better o¤.
We assume capital-intensive sectors to be polluting sectors. To keep things simple, as
we deal only with a one sector aggregate output, we assume that capital input is the main
1 In line with the double dividend literature, we are not seeking for the optimal tax system, which would
require to use several instruments in order to internalize the externalities. Nevertheless, according to our
Pareto-improving criterion, our results give conditions such that the economy gets closer to its Pareto
optimal equilibrium.
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source of pollution (even if it is only a proxy). The key factor is that capital accumula-
tion favors the production of pollution-intensive goods. For industrial pollution, this is
consistent with evidence (Brown et al. [1992], Gale and Mendez [1998], Antweiler
et al. [2001]). Indeed, Brown et al. [1992] show that a 10% change in the Mexican
capital stock induces a 9% increase in electric utility output. The conclusion they draw is
simply that electricity generation is highly capital intensive, and this creates a strong ling
between capital accumulation and sulfur dioxide pollution. In the same way, the empirical
work of Gale and Mendez [1998] investigate the role that capital abundance may play
in predicting cross-country di¤erences in pollution levels. It suggests a strong link beween
factor endowments and pollution level. Finally, Antweiler et al. [2001] nd that a 1%
increase in a nations capital-to-labor ratio, holding scale, income, and other determinants
constant, leads to perhaps a one percentage point increase in pollution.
Our model shares the mean features of Chiroleu-Assouline and Fodha [2005] and
[2006]. As in Chao and Peck [2000] or Williams [2002] or [2003], we assume that the
degradation of environmental quality has a negative impact on the total productivity of
factors. This assumption is justied by the results of an increasing number of empirical
studies measuring the health e¤ects of pollution (OECD [2008]) and the impact of the
health of workers on labor productivity (Bloom et al. [2004], in a sample consisting of both
developing and industrial countries, found that good health, proxied by life expectancy,
has a sizable, positive e¤ect on economic growth). Since Ostro [1983], many papers
have emphasized the loss of productivity caused by the health e¤ects of pollution, e.g.
Samakovlis et al. [2005], or Pervin et al. [2008] for air-pollution, and also Bosello et
al. [2006] or Hübler et al. [2008] for the health e¤ects of climate change. For example,
according to Bosello et al. [2006], strong heat stress causes a productivity loss of 3% and
extreme heat a loss of 12%. Another source of productivity loss originates in the impact
of pollution on the quality of natural resources (Gollop and Swinand [1998] for the
agricultural sector)2.
We assume that the production technology is a function of capital and heterogeneous
labor. Heterogeneous workers live two periods (young and old) and earn wages correspond-
2Our model adresses the specic issue of pollutions due to industrial, highly capital-intensive sectors,
that emit ne particles, NOx or SOx. These pollutants are harmmful for the health of all agents, and
especially of the workers employed by these sectors. As an anonymous referee pointed out, this stylized
model can not describe the GHG case, since the dioxyde emissions have no direct e¤ect on the health and
productivity of workers and they are due to the use of fossil energies which can be susbsituted by carbon
free inputs, such as capital or knowledge.
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ing to their skill and consequently to their productivity. The labor tax is a very general
one that could be either a progressive or proportional tax. Our demographic assumptions
allow us to take into account several income classes; indeed, we consider (i) the hetero-
geneity characteristics of the labor market (high wages - skilled workers, middle wages,
low wages - non skilled workers...), (ii) the heterogeneity of the individual income sources
(wages for workers, savings for retirees). The environmental policy consists of increasing
the environmental tax on savings, in a second-rank framework. We then characterize the
necessary conditions for the obtaining of a double dividend, i.e. an improvement of the
environmental quality and an improvement of the welfare when the revenue of the pollu-
tion tax is recycled by a change in the labor tax rates. Previous studies show that the
obtaining of a double dividend requires economic conditions such that the double dividend
hypothesis seems unrealistic. Conversely, we show that the conditions for the obtaining
of a double dividend lie in the distributive properties of the labor taxes. Even when the
double dividend is not possible, the cost of the pollution regulation can be minimized by
a new designing of the progressivity of the labor tax instead of an homogenous cut in the
labor tax rates. The results are dependent on the initial tax system.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and Section 3 presents
the welfare analysis of a tax policy. Section 4 gives the specication of the balanced
tax reform. In Section 5 we present the environmental e¤ects of the tax reform and
Section 6 examines the welfare e¤ects of such a reform. Section 7 presents some empirical
illustrations and the last section concludes.
II. The Model
We consider an overlapping generations economy with polluting technology of produc-
tion i.e. with polluting capital. Heterogeneous workers live two periods (young and old)
and earn wages corresponding to their skill and consequently to their productivity3. We
assume that Nt individuals are born in period t and that the population remains constant,
so we can normalize Nt to unity. Each household is characterized by its labor class (or
skill) i. There are I classes of agents in the economy (i and I 2 N), and the size of each
3 In our very stylized model, the heterogeneity of workers derives, by assumption, from their skills. In
our case, because the utility function is logarithmic, this model is equivalent to a model with endogenous
work supply and heterogenous desutilities of work. We thank an anonymous referee to have drawn our
attention to this equivalence.
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class i is equal to qi (with
PI
i=1 qi = 1). Each agent supplies one unit of labor
4 when
she is young and earns a wage wit; she divides her labor income between consumption
and savings sit. The sub-optimal initial tax system is composed by an income tax and an
environmental tax intended to nance the public expenditures G: The income (or labor)
tax is a very general one that could be either a progressive or proportional tax as the
labor tax rate is  i 2 [0; 1[. In the second period the household consumes her savings
and the interest she earns. The welfare of an individual born at t is measured with the
intertemporal separable utility function5:
U

ciyt ; c
io
t+1

= (1  ) ln ci;yt +  ln ci;ot+1
with cyt denoting the rst-period consumption of the agent born at t, c
o
t+1 her second-
period consumption.  2 ]0; 1[ represents the individual propensity to save. The two
instantaneous components of the utility function obviously exhibit the usual properties:
they are increasing in their argument, strictly concave and satisfy the Inada conditions.
The real interest rate is rt+1. As the capital is polluting, the environmental policy consists
in a tax on savings  e 2 [0; 1[. The households budget constraints writes:  
1   it

wit = c
iy
t + (1 + 
e
t ) s
i
t
ciot+1 = (1 + rt+1) s
i
t
(1)
The households problem is to choose her consumption path to maximize her lifetime
utility subject to the intertemporal budget constraint.
This yields the optimal consumption and savings path of the representative household,
within the Diamond framework (Diamond [1965]) with a homothetic utility function:8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
ciyt = (1  )
 
1   it

wit
ciot+1 = 
(1 + rt+1)
(1 +  et )
 
1   it

wit
sit = 
 
1   it

(1 +  et )
wit
(2)
4Our long term view allows us to assume full employment. Moreover, we focus on the e¢ ciency double
dividend (according to Goulder [1995]) and not on the employment double dividend.
5We do not introduce any direct e¤ect of pollution on the households welfare, but only the indirect one
through the consequences on productivity of the degradation of environmental quality (see below). Indeed
the direct e¤ect would have no impact on the welfare distribution among heterogenous agents while the
indirect one a¤ects the wage gaps, because agents do not di¤er here by their preferences.
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The production sector consists of many rms, each of them being characterized by the
same Cobb-Douglas production function F () with constant returns to scale. They use
di¤erent kinds of labor (high wages - skilled workers, middle wages, low wages - non skilled
workers) and the total productivity of factors A (Pt) is negatively a¤ected by pollution
Pt because pollution degrades the health of workers or the quality of natural resources
(A (P ) = P e with e > 0):
Yt = A (Pt)F (Kt; Li;t) = A (Pt)K

t
IY
i=1
Lii;t
where  > 0 and i  0 stand for the shares of the input factors in production, +i = 1.
The maximization problem of the representative rm is (taking the output price as
numeraire):
Max
K;fLig
t = A (Pt)K

t
IY
i=1
Lii;t  
IX
i=1
witLi;t   (1 + rt)Kt
with t the current net revenue, wit the real wage rate of class i of workers. The depreci-
ation rate of capital is equal to unity.
Since markets are competitive, capital and labor earn their marginal products:8>><>>:
Yt
Kt
= 1 + rt
iYt
Li;t
= wit
(3)
This yields, at the equilibrium of the labor markets:
Yt = A (Pt)K

t
IY
i=1
qii (4)
The ratio of wages is (using 3):
wit
w1t
=
i
1
q1
qi
Assumption 1: The di¤erent labor classes are ranked by growing skills, i.e. by growing
wages:
wit > w
i 1
t ,
i
qi
>
i 1
qi 1
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We assume that government spending (G) is entirely nanced by current taxes. The
governments budget constraint states that, at each period, its purchases must be equal
to its tax revenues generated by the pollution tax and the labor tax:
IX
i=1
qi
i
tw
i
t + 
e
t
IX
i=1
qis
i
t = Gt (5)
We dene a progressivity index of the labor tax, ai = ab(i), such as:
 i = 1 + ai = 
1 + ab (i)
where 1 is the at component of the tax rate and a is a positive parameter. Assume
b(1) = 0 and b(i+1) > b(i) 8i > 1:We consider the general case for the characteristics of
the tax progressivity6. For example, the design of progressivity ts well the characteristics
of the French tax system when b(i+ 2)  b(i+ 1) < b(i+ 1)  b(i):
This yields
IX
i=1
qi
iwi =
IX
i=1
 iiY = Y
 
1 (1  ) + a
IX
i=1
b(i)i
!
Let us dene BI as the sum
IP
i=1
b (i)i. BI > 0 is constant for any given I and
progressivity characteristics fb(i)g1iI .
The pollution ow is due to the capital stock, and we assume that the welfare is
a¤ected by the stock of pollution only through its e¤ect on the total factor productivity.
The dynamics of pollution are described by the following equation:
Pt = (1  h)Pt 1 + Kt 1 (6)
where h is the constant rate of natural absorption of pollution (0 < h < 1) and  > 0
stands for the emission rate of pollutants.
The equilibrium condition of the capital market, meaning that the capital stock in
period t+1 is the amount saved by young individuals in period t, is obtained by substituting
6Unlike the usual specication of the tax progressivity in the literature, we assume here that  i depends
on the class i of the agent and do not depend directly on the wage wi: As assumption 1 implies a ranking
between i and wi, our denition of the tax progressivity is nearly, but not exactly equivalent to the usual
one, since it relies here on an ordinal concept rather than on a cardinal one, as usual.
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the zero-prot condition, the governments budget constraint (eq. 5) and the households
budget constraints (eq. 1) into the equilibrium of the output good market. It writes:
Kt =
IX
i=1
qis
i
t 1
By substituting eq. 2:
Kt =

1 +  et 1
q1
1
 
1  1t 1

(1  )  aBI

w1t 1 (7)
and using eq. 3, we nally obtain:
Kt =

1 +  et 1
 
1  1t 1

(1  )  aBI

Yt 1 (8)
The steady-state
A steady state equilibrium is an allocation where capital and pollution are stationary,
i.e. K and P  are such that (using eq. 6 and by substitution of eq. 4 in eq. 8):
K =
"

1 +  e
XA (P )
IY
i=1
qii
# 1
1 
(9)
P  =

h
K (10)
with X =
 
1  1 (1  )  aBI , constant for a given tax system.
It is easy to verify that X is always strictly positive, which ensures the existence of a
positive steady-state equilibrium. X > 0 reduces to b (~{) < 1 
1
a where ~{ is the particular
class of worker7 such that b (~{) = 
I
1b(i)i
I1i
. Hence b (~{) is the average of the coe¢ cients of
progressivity, weighted by the shares of each class of worker in the output. X > 0 is then
equivalent to ~{ = 1 + ab (~{) < 1, meaning that the revenue of this particular class is not
totally conscated. This is always veried since we assumed that  i < 1 8i.
The following proposition characterizes the steady state of this model.
7More precisely, b (~{)  I1b(i)i
I1i
and b (~{  1) < I1b(i)i
I1i
, with ~{  I.
9
Proposition 1 For given initial conditions fK0;K 1; P 1g and for a given triplet of
tax policy instruments,

 e; 1; a
	
, the equilibrium conditions can be summed up by eq.
(2) ; (3) ; (5) ; (6) ; (8). Thus, there exists a locally stable steady-state dened by (K; P )
such that:
K =


1 +  e
X
 1
1 ( e)
"

h
 e IY
i=1
qii
# 1
1 ( e)
(11)
P  =

h


1 +  e
X
 1
1 ( e)
"

h
 e IY
i=1
qii
# 1
1 ( e)
Proof. See above for the denition of the capital market equilibrium. Moreover, (i) the
utility function is homothetic, (ii) the utility and the production functions verify the Inada
conditions, (iii) F
00
K < 0, (iv) limK!0 (F
0
K :K=F (K)) 2 [0; 1[. Conditions (i)  (iv) ensure
the existence of the steady-state equilibrium (see de la Croix and Michel [2002] and
Konishi and Perera-Tallo [1997]). Concerning local stability, we show that the steady
state associated with the dynamic system, (6; 8), is a sink (see Appendix).
Using Proposition 1 and eq. 9, one obtains the output value at the steady-state
equilibrium:
Y  =


1 +  e
X
  e
1 ( e)
"

h
 e IY
i=1
qii
# 1
1 ( e)
(12)
Assumption 2:   e > 0:
It means that the direct contribution of capital to output () is greater than the
indirect one through pollution and productivity (e)8.
In the rest of the paper, we will only consider the consequences of variations of the tax
rates on the steady-state equilibrium dened in Proposition 1. The existence of the new
steady-state is ensured if and only if X remains positive, i.e. ~{ + d~{ < 1. Notice that
X may remain positive even if some high wages classes bear a tax rate equal or greater
than unity. A su¢ cient condition to ensure the positivity of X after the tax reform is that
dX > 0, i.e. that the variations of the labor tax components verify   da
d1
< 1 BI , 8d e > 0.
III. Welfare Analysis
8The reverse ( < e) would simplify the analysis but this case would be of negligible economic interest
because any rise in e would result in a decrease of K allowing an increase of Y .
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Like Chiroleu-Assouline and Fodha [2006], we examine here the welfare e¤ects of
the tax change for a generation during its life-cycle, once the nal steady-state equilibrium
is reached. In this section, the welfare issue is thus a long term one.
One can measure the welfare e¤ects of small tax changes by the marginal excess burden.
It corresponds to the additional income that needs to be provided to the representative
household to keep her utility at its initial level: this is the compensatory income variation,
denoted dR. It stands for the excess welfare loss of the consumers over and above the
tax revenues collected by the government and can be interpreted as the hidden costs of
nancing public spending: a positive value for the marginal excess burden indicates a loss
in welfare after the tax reform.
Let us determine the compensatory income variation which, after the tax reform, would
leave the level of life-cycle utility unchanged (dU = 0):
@U
@ciy
dciy +
@U
@cio
dcio = 0
() (1 + r)
(1 +  e)
dciy + dcio = 0
The intertemporal budget constraint of household i writes:
 
1   iwi = ciy + (1 +  e)
(1 + r)
cio
Remember that
cio =

(1  )
(1 + r)
(1 +  e)
ciy
We use the rst-order conditions of the representative households program and the
denition of the compensatory income variation dR: 
1   i dwi   wi  d1 + b (i) da+ dRi = dc^iy   c^io
(1 + r)2
dr +
c^io
(1 + r)
d e +
(1 +  e)
1 + r
dc^io
=  (1 + 
e) c^io
(1 + r)2
dr +
c^io
(1 + r)
d e
this leads to:
dRi =    1   i dwi + wi  d1 + b (i) da  (1 +  e) c^io
(1 + r)2
dr +
c^io
(1 + r)
d e (13)
Unlike Bovenberg and de Moiij [1994] and the greater part of the literature on
this subject, it is here impossible to distinguish an environmental component and a non-
environmental one, because pollution and production a¤ect each other. In this paper, we
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are thus constrained to depart from the usual denition of the double dividend (Goulder
[1995]) because of this non-separability: a double dividend will be characterized by the
simultaneous decrease of pollution (which stands for the usual rst dividend) and increase
of economic welfare (which depends here also on the pollution level).
The increase of welfare is veried for any variations of consumptions such that dcy=cy+
(1 )dco=co > 0. This property plays an important role in our results. The rst dividend
requires a decrease of the capital stock inducing a decrease of the output, but this does not
prevent the obtaining of the economic dividend. This originates in the opposite impacts
of dK on w and r: dw=dK > 0 and dr=dK < 0.
Proposition 2 The increase of the environmental tax is regressive i.e. it more heavily
penalises the lowest wage-earners.
Proof. Let us compute the steady-state value of the compensatory income variation for
agent i:
dRi
i
qi
Y 
= Z
 
1   i
(1 +  e)
d e (14)
+

(Z   ) (1  )
X
+
1
(1   i)
  
1   i d1
+

(Z   ) BI
X
+
b (i)
(1   i)
  
1   i da
with Z =  e1 ( e) > 0.
Notice that from the optimality conditions of the rm (eq. 3) and the equilibrium condition
of the labor market, we have
i
qi
Y  = wi. Hence, when d1 = da = 0, one obtains, for
any environmental tax increase d e > 0 :
dRi
wi
= Z
 
1   i
(1 +  e)
d e > 0
then, as Z > 0, dRi > 0 for every i. But dRi=wi is smaller when  i is higher (i.e. i is also
high) and when wi is higher. When the environmental policy harms the consumers, the
relative burden is greater for the less skilled9.
9This result does not rely on the usual channels causing the regressivity of an environmental tax. Indeed,
as preferences are identical among agents, their savings rate and their budget share for polluting goods are
the same. Our regressivity property results from the progressivity characteristics of the labor tax.
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The consequences of the increase of the environmental tax  e are clearly harmful for all
the agents as it implies a decrease of the second-period consumption without any positive
e¤ect on the rst-period one. Concerning the labor tax, its impact is ambiguous, for the
at component as well as for the progressivity index. This is because the decrease of the
income of the agents could be compensated by an increase of the interest rate raising the
consumption of the old agents. This latter e¤ect increases with .
IV. The Specication of the Balanced Tax Reform
We assume an exogenous increase of the environmental tax rate, imposed by the gov-
ernment in order to control pollution. The amount of government spending is assumed ex
post invariant, and the tax policy has to maintain the amount of the tax revenues con-
stant10. This increase d e of the environmental tax rate can be accompanied by a variation
of the labor tax rates d i by two potential means: a homogenous variation of all labor
tax rates through the at rate component (d1) or a variation in the progressivity of the
labor tax (dai through a variation of a). At the steady-state equilibrium, the governments
budget constraint is:
 
1 (1  ) + aBI

Y  +  eK = G
The link between the variations of the pollution tax and of the characteristics of the
labor tax is obtained through the di¤erentiation of this constraint, which is quite direct
(using eq. 12).
Any balanced tax reform is then characterized by the following relationship between
d e, d1 and da (with dG = dqi = di = 0):
(1  ) d1 +BIda =  ( +	)
(1 + 	)
X
d e
1 +  e
(15)
where 	 =  
 
1 (1  ) + aBI

+ K

Y 
1
( e)
e

Z
X  0 (with X > 0), constant.
10As noticed previously, this tax reform does not constitute the optimal one. Seeking for optimality
would require to take into account the intergenerational externality on capital accumulation (dynamic
e¢ ciency) and the environmental externality. These two externalities would be corrected by the use of our
two taxes. Concerning the distribution of welfare among the agents, we have to consider intergenerational
and intragenerational characteristics. Intergenerational optimality considerations turn to the very general
debate about the choice of the discount rate. But in our very simple model, the heterogeneity of workers
is not an externality and would not deserve any correction. Intragenerational welfare would be the sum of
the welfare of each class weighted by its size.
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We will study two polar cases for balancing this environmental tax reform:
 uniform variation of all labor tax rates, with invariant progressivity (da = 0):
d1 =  ( +	)
(1 + 	)
X
(1  )
d e
1 +  e
=    d e (16)
 variation of the progressivity, with invariant at rate component of the tax rate
(d1 = 0):
da =  ( +	)
(1 + 	)
X
BI
d e
1 +  e
=   
 d e (17)
Proposition 3 The sign of the balanced tax reform multipliers  and 
 is a priori unde-
termined and depends on the initial tax rates and on the values of the various elasticities.
Proof. (i) The numerator measures the e¤ect of the change in pollution tax rate on its
revenue. There are both a value e¤ect (the tax revenue increases with the tax rate, for
unchanged stock of capital), summed up by 	, and a tax base e¤ect (the stock of capital
decreases, and so does the output; as the tax rate increases, so the tax base erodes),
conditioned by , which work in opposite ways. As a result, this term might be positive
(if 	 >  ) or negative.
(ii) The denominator measures the e¤ect of the change in labor tax rate on its revenue.
There are also both a value e¤ect proportional to 	 (the tax revenue increases with the
tax rate, for unchanged wages) and a tax base e¤ect (the wages decrease as the tax rate
increases, thus the tax base erodes) which work in opposite ways. As a result, this term
too might be positive or negative (if 	 >  1).
As the signs of the numerator and of the denominator are undetermined, the sign of the
necessary change in the labor tax components is also undetermined.
Assumption 3: We only consider the La¤er-e¢ ciency case, where the sign of the bal-
anced tax reform multipliers  and 
 is positive.
Under eq. 15, Assumption 3 implies
 +	
1 +	
> 0,  	 > 1 or  	 < .
V. The Environmental E¤ects of the Tax Reform
As steady-state pollution depends only on steady-state capital, we nd straightforward
that the rst dividend (i:e: a decrease of pollution) is reached if dP  =

h
dK < 0: This
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condition rewrites (see Proposition 1):
dK
K
=   1
1  (  e)

d e
1 +  e
+
(1  ) d1 +BIda
X

< 0
As 1   (  e) > 0, this condition reduces to d
e
1 +  e
+
(1  ) d1 +BIda
X
> 0: We then
have the two cases corresponding to the two alternative policies:
 invariant progressivity (da = 0) : d
e
1 +  e
>
(1  ) d e
X
 variation of the progressivity  d1 = 0 : d e
1 +  e
>
BI
d
e
X
:
We obtain a rst dividend if the multipliers are not too high:8>><>>:
 <
X
(1 +  e) (1  )

 <
X
(1 +  e)BI
()  +	
1 +	
< 1 (18)
This means that the decrease of the labor tax (either of the at rate component or of the
progressivity index) should be not too great in order not to jeopardize the environmental
benet of the reform.
Assumption 4: We only consider the case where the tax policy decreases pollution.
Proposition 4 Under Assumptions (1-4), the tax policy is e¢ cient and reduces pollution
if and only if the initial environmental tax rate is not too high:  e < 1=Z.
Proof. We have to examine the two cases which verify the tax e¢ ciency assumption (Ass.
3).
If (i) : 1 <  	; then  +	
1 +	
< 1 ,  > 1 : which conicts with the basic assumption on
: The environmental benet can never be achieved.
If (ii) :  	 < ; then  +	
1 +	
< 1,  < 1 : always veried.
Finally, such that to reach the rst dividend under the tax e¢ ciency assumption, one
needs to impose  	 < ; which is a necessary and su¢ cient condition. This condition is
met if and only if:  
1 (1  ) + aBI

+ 1+eX
1
( e)
e

Z
X < 
, 1 (1  ) + aBI + e1+eX 1( e) < XZ
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which implies
e
1+eX
1
( e) < 
X
Z
, (  e) < 11+e
,  e < 1 ( e) e
QED.
VI. The Welfare E¤ects of the Tax Reform
As each policy does not a¤ect all classes equally, one can wonder which one will be
preferred by each class of worker.
Proposition 5 (i) The environmental tax reform preferred by the workers of the lowest
classes consists of a decrease in the at rate component of the tax rate 1 (ii) but the one
preferred by the workers of the highest classes consists of a decrease in the progressivity of
the wage tax rate.
Proof. Let us compare the compensatory income variations associated with each policy.
 First case (dRi(1)): uniform variation of all labor tax rates (with invariant progres-
sivity): da = 0 and d1 =    d e
dRi(1)
i
qi
Y 
= Z
 
1   i
(1 +  e)
d e
 

(Z   )
X
(1  ) + 1
(1   i)
  
1   i d e
 Second case (dRi(a)): variation of the progressivity (with invariant at rate compo-
nent): d1 = 0 , dai = b (i) da and da =   
 d e
dRi(a)
i
qi
Y 
= Z
 
1   i
(1 +  e)
d e
 

(Z   )
X
BI +
b (i)
(1   i)
  
1   i
d e
16
i%
Agents prefer
da < 0
Agents prefer
??1 < 0
0
?i
b(i)
i
Figure 1: An Illustration of Workers Class Threshold in the French Case
The signs of these compensatory income variations depend on the values of the
characteristics of the economy (, e, b(i), i) and of the initial tax rates ( e,  i, a).
We now compare the relative e¤ects on welfare of the two tax policies. Consequently,
we have to determine the sign of i = dRi(1)   dRi(a) for the workers of class i.
i
i
qi
Y 
=  

(Z   )
X
(1  )  1   i+ 1 + (Z   )
X
BI
 
1   i+ b (i)
 T 0
Using eq. 16 and 17 (



=
1  
BI
), we nd that this sign is equal to the sign of:
b (i)
1  
BI
  1 = b (i) i
b (i)i
  1
Therefore the particular averageworkersclass ~{ dened above is indi¤erent be-
tween both policies (~{ = 0). Each class of workers of a higher skill would prefer a
decrease in the progressivity index, da < 0, and, conversely, each less skilled class of
workers would prefer a decrease in the at rate component of the wage tax, d1 < 0
(Figure 1 corresponding to the French case of a progressive labor tax).11
The result above suggests that, in the case where some workersclasses would be suf-
fering from a deterioration of their welfare after the above tax reforms, an appropriate
11 In order to simplify the graphics (especially Figure 3), we have chosen to plot gures as if all functions
were continuously dened over a great number of workers classes.
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policy mix could be designed in order to leave each workersclass unharmed by the envi-
ronmental tax reform : it would consist in an increase of the progressivity index together
with a decrease of the at rate component of the wage tax rate.
Assume that the balanced tax reform is dened by d1 < 0 and da =  d1 with
 > 0 hence da > 0. Such a compensation for the increase in the environmental tax rate
will imply a greater decrease of 1 than above because the degree of progressivity is raised.
Proposition 6 For economies where a decrease in the minimal wage rate does not su¢ ce
to re-establish the welfare of some class of worker, one can choose  in order to ensure
that all classes will be better o¤ with the environmental tax reform.
Proof. Let us specify the link implied by such a policy between the increase in the
environmental tax rate and the decrease in the at component of the wage tax.
d e =   1

d1   1


da =   1






  

d1 =   1



1  
BI
  

d1
To ensure the existence of the new steady-state equilibrium, we have shown above (Ass.
2) that we need   da
d1
=  < 1 BI . This condition also ensures the decrease of the at rate
component of the labor tax.
The compensatory income variation of the balanced mix policy is:
dRi()
i
qi
Y d e
=


1 
BI
  
 " 1

dRi1
i
qi
Y d e
+ 
"
(Z   ) BI
X
 
1   i+ b (i)  BI
1  
1

Z
 
1   i
(1 +  e)
##
with Z > 0; X > 0; constants.
- dRi() S 0; 8i = 1; :::I:
- dRi() is not monotonous in b (i), nor in , 8i.
- If dRi(1) < 0; 8i = 1; :::I, all classes will be better o¤ even with  = 0:
If 9i; dRi(1) > 0; as the function dRi() is bound for each , there is one { which
maximizes it (see Fig. 2 for a simple illustration):
{ = INT
h
argmax dRi()
i
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Figure 2: An Illustration of the Policy-Mix Criterion
One can choose  > 0 in order to nullify dR{() : it ensures that all classes will be better
o¤ (their compensatory income variations are all negative or null).
 =
Z
 
1  1   ab ({)
(1 +  e)
  
h 
1  1   ab ({) (Z   ) (1 )X + 1i

"
BI
1  
1

Z
 
1  1   ab ({)
(1 +  e)
  (Z   ) BI
X
(1  1   ab ({))  b ({)
#
This policy mix aims to reduce the pre-existing distortions of the tax system, in a
second-best world, but not to reach an optimal outcome. Therefore  comes from our
Pareto-improving criterion but not from any optimality criterion.
It may be useful now to sum up the main mechanisms at work. The primary conse-
quence of the environmental policy is the decrease of the pollution allowed by the decrease
of the capital stock which also implies a reduction of the output. The cost of this environ-
mental benet consists in a fall in the gross wages of all agents. Nevertheless, for some
groups of agents, this decline of the gross wages may be slowed by a decrease of their
labor tax rate (for any group i such that b(i) < 1=). The harmful e¤ect of the fall in net
wages on the total life-cycle consumption can be somehow counterbalanced by the drop
in the capital stock, implying a rise of the interest rate which benets the second-period
consumption.
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The heterogeneity characteristics of the economy and the progressivity of the labor tax
allow the government to obtain more revenues from the environmental policy. The decrease
of the at rate component can be greater without compromising the environmental benet.
Moreover, it enables the redistribution of welfare between the agents in order to fulll our
Pareto-improvement criterion.
Observe that even if the productivity is insensitive to pollution (e = 0) and/or if the
pollution would a¤ect the households welfare in an additive way, our results would still
be robust and contribute to the standard literature.
VII. The French Case: A Simple Empirical Illustration
In order to illustrate the economic and welfare consequences of the environmental
policy-mix, we choose some realistic values for the parameters of our theoretical model.
Then, under these parametersconguration, we compute the variations of compensatory
income with respect to the class of agents i: Actually, we want to test the sensitivity of
 with respect to the initial level of the labor tax rates. In more detail, we compute the
values of the dRi(1); dR
i
(a) and dR
i
() for di¤erent realistic values of 
i:
The initial tax system is supposed to be dened by the following values:  e = 0:01;
1 = 0:1 and a = 0:1: Concerning the environmental tax rate, it corresponds closely to the
budget of the French Environment and Energy Management Agency (ADEME) which is
entirely nanced by environmental tax revenues. The at rate component of the labor tax
is the average income tax bearing on the rst decile of taxable households. The design of
the progressivity index is very general and ts well with many West European cases. More
precisely, the wage tax rate writes  i = 1+ab (i) with b (i) =  ln i:We have considered 7
cases:  = (0:01; 0:1; 0:5; 1; 1:5; 2; 3), see Fig. 3. In particular, the French case corresponds
to  = 1:5:
The share of capital in total output is very common for developed countries ( = 0:35)
and we assume no particular preferences for the future ( = 0:5).
The environmental parameters are not easy to dene. We xed these values to some
reasonable levels for this literature: e = 0:05;  = 10; h = 0:3. Nevertheless, our results
are robust to any changes in the values of these parameters.
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Figure 3: The Wage Tax Rates
Table I.  Labor Market Characteristics
Class i
(I = 10)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
qi 0:1 0:1 0:1 0:1 0:1 0:1 0:1 0:1 0:1 0:1
i 0:01 0:02 0:03 0:04 0:05 0:06 0:07 0:1 0:12 0:15
wi=w1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 12 15
Table I. presents the labor market characteristics. We assume an equi-distribution of
the workers among the classes, such that qi = 0:1; 8i and I = 10; hence each i represents
a decile of the corresponding class. We calibrated the shares in total output for workers
of class i (i) such that the ratios of wages t the French data. This ratio is equal to 15
for the highest class.
Table II.  The Policy Mix
Prog. Case: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 0:01 0:1 0:5 1 1:5 2 3
 0:1 0:11 ? ? 0:26 0:23 Tax ine¢ ciency
We have numerically computed the value of  required by the policy mix according to
the di¤erent cases of progressivity (see Table II.). Concerning the low progressivity cases
 = 0:01 (resp. 0:1); the consequences on welfare of the alternative policies, measured by
dRi(1) and dR
i
(a), show that the rst class would be damaged by the policies, the second
class is una¤ected, and all the other classes would be better o¤. These policies are not
Pareto improving. But, if the government can combine variations of the two parts of the
labor tax rate and design a policy-mix system, he has to x  to 0:1 (resp. 0:11). Therefore,
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even the rst class would benet from the environmental tax policy. The increase in the
welfare of the upper classes will be reduced, but is still high, comparatively to the lower
classes.
For some intermediate levels of the labor tax rate ( = 0:5 and 1), it is impossible
to dene a policy compatible with the Pareto-improvement criterion. This conguration
could be explained by the initial characteristics of the tax system. For these cases, the
initial values are e¢ cient, close to their optimal level. Hence, some agents would su¤er a
big decrease in their revenues that could not be compensated by the small gains of the
agents who benet from the tax policy. When the progressivity part of the labor tax
rate is too high ( = 3), the tax system is obviously characterized by the ine¢ ciency
properties. Finally, for some reasonable values of the progressivity index  = 1:5 (resp. 2),
close to the French economic data, the alternative policies are unambiguously harmful for
all the classes of workers. But, by xing  to 0:26 (resp. 0:23), the environmental policy
would benet all the agents. The environmental tax policy is then Pareto-improving and
acceptable.
VIII. Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that a budget-neutral environmental tax reform may
result in a double dividend (dened as a decrease in pollution and an increase in the global
economic welfare), even when the economy is characterized by heterogenous agents (old
and young) and many worker classes (heterogenous labor). We have also emphasized that
the conditions for the obtaining of a double dividend depend on the distributive properties
of the labor taxes. Hence, we have shown that (i) an increase of the environmental
tax deteriorates the welfare of all and is regressive, (ii) the low paid workers prefer an
environmental tax reform balanced by a decrease in the at rate component but the high
paid workers prefer a decrease of the progressivity.
Even when the double dividend is not possible, the cost of the pollution regulation
can be minimized by a new designing of the progressivity of the labor tax instead of a
homogenous cut in the labor tax rates. We conclude that the distributive properties of the
tax policy could be one of the instruments of fair internalization of the intergenerational
externalities.
To a certain extent, our paper highlights the gap between economic e¢ ciency and
vertical equity and illustrates the problem of the aggregation of positive and negative
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compensatory variations: the usual method of aggregation gives a higher weight to the
wealthiest classes and introduces a bias when assessing the desirability or the acceptability
of any environmental tax reform.
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Appendix
Proof of local stability (Proposition 1)
To prove the local stability part of the proposition, we linearize the dynamic system
(6; 8) around the steady state. The linear approximation can be written in matrix form
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as: 2664
Kt+1  K
Pt+1   P 
xt+1   x
zt+1   z
3775 = 
2664
Kt  K
Pt   P 
xt   x
zt   z
3775
where  =
2664
 0  e (1  h) K(1 h)P +K  e K

(1 h)P +K
 1  h 0 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
3775 ; xt+1 = Pt and
zt+1 = Kt: The characteristic polynomial of  is
P () = 2
h
2 + (P (h(2 h) (1 h) 1) K(1 h+))+P (1 h(2 h))+K((1 h)+e)P (1 h)+K
i
We know that P =K = =h: So, we have the following properties P (0) = 0; P (1) =
(1 +e)

h
(1 h)+ > 0 and P ( 1) =

h
((2 h)(1+)+he)

h
(1 h)+ > 0:
For su¢ cient conditions to local stability, we need that the modulus of each eigenvalue
to be lower than one. We can decompose the characteristic polynomial into two parts:
P () = P1 () :P2 (), with P1 () = 2. Basically, the characteristic polynomial has two
eigenvalues equal to 1 = 2 = 0: Then we have to study the second part of P () i.e.
P2 () = 2 + (P (h(2 h) (1 h) 1) K(1 h+))+P (1 h(2 h))+K((1 h)+e)P (1 h)+K :
We already know that P (1) > 0 and P ( 1) > 0; which induce that P2 (1) > 0 and
P2 ( 1) > 0: Regarding P2 (0) = P (1 h(2 h))+K((1 h)+e)P (1 h)+K =

h
(1 h(2 h))+((1 h)+e)

h
(1 h)+ =
 (1  h) + he > 0: We now need P2 (0) < 1 which turns to  (1  h) + he < 1; that is
always true under Assumption 2. Hence, the steady state equilibrium (K; P ) is locally
stable.
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